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The current development of economic 
diplomacy in the world is determined by a 
combination of globalization and regionali-
zation. In addition, it has an economic di-
mension. At the same time, the Baltic Sea re-
gion demonstrates large-scale politicisation 
of economic cooperation. The development 
of nuclear power in the eastern part of the 
Baltic Sea is indicative of the effectiveness of 
political and economic cooperation in the 
region. The author believes that Russia and 
the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania have the economic and technologi-
cal opportunities for building up cooperation 
in the field of energy. This points to a ques-
tion whether the traditional patterns of rela-
tions that developed among these countries 
in the past can be changed. A more pro-
nounced international division of labour ac-
companied by the historically developed spe-
cialization of Russia makes nuclear power an 
important factor in Russia’s economic di-
plomacy. The promotion of Russian energy 
projects in the region contributes to the de-
velopment of a system of mutually beneficial 
ties. The increasing energy deficiency in the 
region can serve an economic prerequisite to 
this process. 
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After the energy crisis in the mid-70s, 
the energy factor began to play a role in 
world politics that was equal in its im-
portance to that of the military one. This 
resulted in developing external energy 
policy and energy diplomacy by a num-
ber of influential states as they viewed 
them as important elements of their for-
eign policy and diplomatic activities. 
Over the last three decades, energy 
has played an important role in interna-
tional relations and global politics, and 
intergovernmental interaction in this 
sphere has strengthened significantly. It 
became especially evident in 1997—
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2000, when — following large fluctuations in oil prices — the world energy 
economy experienced a serious downturn, which gave rise to speculations 
about a new energy crisis and reshaped world energy politics, both globally 
and regionally. In a new geopolitical situation with a new set of threats to 
world security, the need for intergovernmental cooperation aimed at ensur-
ing energy security at global and regional levels becomes increasingly pro-
nounced. 
When speaking of energy, one often faces a problem of political and 
economic aspects being closely intertwined. On the one hand, it is a highly 
profitable industry that ensures large and stable income and attracts a lot of 
private capital. On the other hand, energy is a problem rooted in the depth of 
sovereign interests of any country: it is a necessary condition of its survival 
and stable development of the economy so it attracts close attention of the 
government. H. Morgenthau and R. Aron mentioned energy in a list of the 
key components of state power. Today, energy resources are not just a com-
modity but also a tool of political and economic influence in international 
relations. 
Russia’s foreign policy incorporates a considerable economic dimension. 
In this sense, it hardly differs from the foreign policy of any other state inte-
grated into the world economy. At the same time, one cannot but mention 
that Russian economic diplomacy has a distinguishing feature: it provokes 
an inadequate reaction of Russia’s business partners. 
The Eastern Baltic capitals strongly believe that the “energy integration” 
with Russia is one of the strategic threats to national security. If, in Brussels, 
this belief is clad in diplomatically correct garments, in Tallinn, it sports a 
vulgar mass-media outfit. The length of this article does not allow us to con-
sider all reasons behind this phenomenon. However, one can mention that 
the situation is affected by complicated historical and political problems. 
These problems have existed, in the case of the Baltic States, over a century-
long period and, in the case of Poland, over a period five times longer. A re-
nowned Polish expert, Zygmunt Berdychowski, rightfully emphasises that 
“at the moment, the EU’s eastern policy is of largely reactive, emotional 
character. In the case of Eastern Europe it is a product of the historical heri-
tage” [1]. We can agree with Zygmunt Berdychowski only to some extent. In 
my opinion, the interpretation of the Baltic States’ policy towards Russia as 
an irrational one is erroneous. In effect, all major prerequisites for the mod-
ern foreign policy of these states developed in the period of struggle for in-
dependence and are based on target setting and a scrupulous analysis of the 
balance of political and economic dividends, as well as that of the 20th cen-
tury political history. 
Mistakes are made quite rarely and, as a rule, relate to an incorrect 
analysis of long-term trends of national, regional, and global develop-
ment. Let us provide several examples. The formal and informal dis-
crimination of non-titular population is economically beneficial and po-
litically justifiable in the medium-term perspective. It allows the national 
elite to fight off competition in the struggle for key political and eco-
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nomic positions. In the long-term perspective, it decreases the quality of 
social capital, which will inevitably affect the prospects for the develop-
ment of the mentioned states. 
The second example relates immediately to the issue explored in this 
article. The anti-Russian rhetoric presented as concerns over energy secu-
rity and the so-called “third package” can yield short-term political effects, 
such as parliamentary seats, European grants, and governmental sinecures. 
In the long-perm perspective, energy independence from Russia will inevi-
tably transform into dependence on other partners and result in a qualita-
tive growth in energy and heating charges. The Bulgarian scenario [2] can 
be repeated in the countries that exit cheap nuclear energy in favour of 
subsidised “green energy”. Moreover, the whole EU’s system of energy 
development regulation is built in such a way that electricity charges can-
not but rise. 
For Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the secession from the USSR did not 
result in energy shortages. The energy-non-intensive local economies easily 
adapted to changes in price proportions and an increase in real electricity 
costs. In many sectors of the economy, market relations coexisted peacefully 
with totally centralised energy supply, which ensured a predictable and 
gradual increase in charges for small countries with insufficient energy re-
sources. Thus, “the impact of the power industry on the current economic 
standing of the Baltic States and the efficiency of the sector did not serve as 
key factors for the reforms to commence” [3]. 
One must also emphasise that, from the technological point of view, 
there is a single “post-Soviet energy space”, which still brings together the 
whole territory of the former USSR and Mongolia. At the beginning of 
2002, the CIS Electric Energy Council (CIS EEC) expressed its interest in 
the synchronous connection of the energy systems of the CIS and the Bal-
tic countries (IPS/UPS) to the energy systems of the UCTE (Union for the 
Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity) member states. Baltic politi-
cians also stressed on numerous occasions the need for integration with the 
UCTE. At the same time, there is an agreement between the energy com-
panies of Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (BRELL), whose 
electrical networks form a single electrical network, on the parallel opera-
tion of energy systems of February 7, 2001. At the moment, the Baltic 
States actively discuss the secession from BRELL and synchronisation 
with the UCTE. This issue became relevant after the accession of these 
states to the EU. 
The situation in the field of energy started to change at the economic, 
technological, and political levels after the Baltic States’ accession to the 
EU. Let us consider the case of Estonia. The Eesti Energia chairman, Gunnar 
Okk, emphasised, when speaking to journalists in 2003, that there would be 
no increase in electricity charges after Estonia’s accession to the EU [3]. In 
2007, the new Eesti Enegia chair stressed that the organisation made every-
thing possible not to depend on Russian gas in electricity generation and was 
seeking for the ways to diversify its production through using renewable en-
ergy and nuclear energy [5]. Diversity had been reached, and Estonian elec-
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tricity prices were set by NORD POOL. However, since the Estonian energy 
market started operating (January 1, 2013), night electricity prices have risen 
by 127 %, the day charge has increased by 48 %. Earlier, the Estonian Minis-
try of Economics had promised that an increase would not exceed 20 % [6]. 
One should take into account the degree of the law-abidance of Estonian 
citizens in order to assess the significance of a rally against rising electricity 
prices that took place on February 18, 2013 in Tallinn at the building of the 
Ministry of Economics and Communications. However, Estonia is limitedly 
dependent on Russian energy resources and hardly classifies as an energy 
deficient state. 
The situation in Latvia is almost similar. Latvia’s current electricity gen-
eration policy can result in a 63 % increase in average electricity charges [7]. 
In the Lithuanian Republic, pricing problems relate to the fact that on 
December 31, 2009, the second (and the last) reactor of the Ignalina NPP 
was shut down as part of the country’s accession agreement to the EU. Up to 
50 % of the electricity generated at the NPP was exported to Belarus and the 
Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation [8]. 
The situation resulting from the closure of the Ignalina NPP catalysed 
the discussion of a common energy policy. The Baltic Prime Ministers 
signed a Declaration on the Security of Supply in the Baltic States and a 
Common European Energy Policy on February 27, 2006. 
On December 8, 2006, a communique of the Prime Ministers’ Council 
of the Baltic States pertaining to joint expert consultations between the 
three Baltic States and Poland on the construction of a NPP in Lithuania 
was signed. It is worth noting that, as early as summer 2008, at the 198th 
International Economic Forum in Poland during the workshop discussion 
on the prospects of development of nuclear energy in the Baltic Sea region, 
the head of Eesti Energia AS emphasized that Estonia had certain doubts of 
political and economic nature regarding the Lithuanian nuclear project. So, 
since 2008, the political and business elites, as well as the expert commu-
nity in the Baltic States have been trying to persuade each other that there 
is a consensus over the nuclear energy issue. However, these assurances 
have been accompanied by mutual accusations. In November 2012, another 
meeting on nuclear energy took place, this time at the presidential level. 
The nature of comments published by the mass media of the three coun-
tries, as well as the official comments, indicated that the parties made a de-
cision to withhold information on the event and avoid public attention to 
the failure of the common Baltic energy policy. The ensuing statements 
and the policy of the Baltic States proved that the meeting had been far 
from a success. 
The President of Estonia, Toomas Hendik Ilves, expressed his confusion 
and concern about the changed position of Lithuania on the construction of 
the Visaginas NPP. On the same day, the Prime Minister of Lithuania, Al-
girdas Butkevičius, responded that he had different information, specifically, 
that Estonia and Latvia had not provided any written statements regarding 
the project’s return on investment. He also expressed his surprise at the 
comment. The position of the President of Estonia is representative. It is not 
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possible to admit the failure of the Baltic energy integration plans, nor is it 
possible to show any success. 
In February 2013, the President of Estonia criticised the Lithuanian au-
thorities for delays in the implementation of the Visaginas NPP project. He 
emphasised that, since the signing of the Declaration on the Security of Sup-
ply in the Baltic States and a Common European Energy Policy (February 
27, 2006), nothing had been done [9]. 
Thus, alongside the objectives for the common energy market develop-
ment set in 2003—2004 for all accession countries, Lithuania was deprived 
of 80 % of its energy capacities. In these conditions, it would be logical to 
combine the efforts of at least the three Baltic States and to consider the pos-
sibility of economic (energy) cooperation with Russia. However, neither 
took place. 
Discussions on the energy issue among the Baltic States and, at certain 
stages, Poland have continued over ten years. The central topics — a financing 
mechanism and a construction site — have not been settled. Three years ago, 
the situation was as follows: “The first unit of the Baltic NPP in Kaliningrad is 
expected to be launched in 2016, the second one in 2018. Belarus is planning 
to complete phase 1 within the same time framework. The Visaginas NPP is 
expected to be put into operation in 2018—2020” [10]. Now the situation is 
different. One can say with complete assurance that the competitors of the Bal-
tic NPP are 3—4 years behind as far as the project implementation is con-
cerned. The Visaginas NPP project includes the construction of a power gen-
erating unit on the basis of a Hitachi-GE’s ABWR reactor of a capacity of 
more than 1,300 MW, which is to be put into operation in 2022—2023, pro-
vided that the construction begins in 2014. Thus, if the plan comes to fruition, 
it will be the fourth completed project after the Leningrad NPP-2, the Baltic 
NPP, and the Astravyets NPP. Therefore, its implementation, which already 
raises concerns, seems to be economically irrational. The issue of expenditure 
or, more precisely, return on investment is rather acute and explains the situa-
tion around the construction of the Visaginas NPP. In May 2012, the previous 
government of Lithuania approved a concession agreement, according to 
which, the strategic partner — the Japanese company Hitachi — owes 20 %, 
Lithuania 38 %, Estonia 22 %, and Latvia 20 % of the shares of the new NPP 
[11]. The precise cost of the project has not been made public; however, 
Lithuanian mass media reports that the minimum cost is 5bn euros. It means 
that the expenditure of each state ranges from 1bn euros in the case of Estonia 
and Latvia, and 2bn euros in the case of Lithuania. According to the calcula-
tions of the Estonian Ministry of Finances, the country’s state budget revenue 
amounted to 6.1bn euros in 2012, i. e. Estonia’s contribution constitutes almost 
20 % of the state’s budget revenue. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the situation around the energy security 
of Lithuania and Latvia changed dramatically after a referendum that took 
place in Lithuania in October 2012: 62.68 % of the republic’s citizens ob-
jected to the idea of the construction of the NPP. However, the referendum 
was of consultative nature and its results are not legally binding for the au-
thorities. A work group was set up within the Lithuanian Parliament, which 
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was commissioned to prepare and put for a vote a draft decision on the con-
struction of the Visaginas NPP. The Lithuanian referendum is a benchmark 
event on a long path paved with fruitless attempts to coordinate the energy 
policy of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; its results indicate that the citizens 
are reluctant to pay for politically charged projects that lack any economic 
rationale. 
As to possible energy cooperation with Russia, the Baltic States cultivate a 
critical attitude towards energy integration with Russia. This approach seems 
to be ill-grounded. The only case, when Russia acted harshly when defending 
its position, was that of putting the oil pipeline stretching to the 
Mažeikiai refinery across the territory of Latvia out of operation. However, the 
economic and political context of this incident — a ban on Russia’s participa-
tion in the bidding to purchase the Mažeikiai refinery — is often forgotten. 
 
*   *   * 
 
The development of nuclear energy in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea 
region is not a technological or even economic issue. We are facing a situa-
tion, which can reveal the real rather than declarative possibilities for the de-
velopment of relations between the Baltic States, Poland and Russia. It re-
lates not to the competition between the Visaginas and Baltic NPP projects, 
but rather to a more serious issue of the prospects of Russian-Baltic rela-
tions, and the actual and imaginary dependencies relating to these countries. 
It is worth noting that, in the philosophical and methodological framework, 
the category of “dependence” suggests mutual harmonisation of interests and 
opportunities. In the case of the new energy facilities in the eastern Baltic 
region, the situation will not be different. The completion of the Baltic NPP 
project will result both in a greater dependence of electricity consumers on 
the seller and that of the seller on the consumer. 
For the first time, Russian economic diplomacy has a chance to achieve 
notable success in one of the most problematic areas — the Baltic States. 
Thus, today, the relations between Russia and its immediate neighbours have 
an opening for a breakthrough, which can contribute to pragmatisation of in-
tergovernmental relations. There are sufficient political and economic pre-
requisites for this outcome. 
Firstly, the expert community is almost unanimous in the opinion that 
the region delineated by Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus, 
and Russia without the Kaliningrad exclave experiences a deficit in generat-
ing capacities, which cannot be overcome without the use of nuclear energy. 
Partially, this situation has developed as a result of the short-sighted policy 
of the European Union, which simultaneously closed the Ignalina NPP in 
Lithuania and curbed the traditional shale energy in Estonia (it is not to be 
confused with shale gas energy) [12]. 
Secondly, in the conditions of economic growth in Poland and the Kalin-
ingrad region, which is suggested by almost all forecasts, these territories 
might also experience a deficit in generating capacities. 
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Thirdly, being guided by different considerations, both Russia and the 
Baltic States analyse the prospects of new energy bridges to Finland, Swe-
den, and Poland. Probably, one should consider the Belarus and Kaliningrad 
NPP construction plans in this context. 
Fourthly, energy is inevitably affected by the globalisation trends con-
tributing to further integration in the fields of economy and technology. 
There is also economy of scale. Larger energy systems are more technologi-
cally reliable and ensure the interchange of surplus and peak power, and 
solve the problem of auxiliary emergency capacities. In this context, the in-
tegration of energy systems is logical and economically efficient, whereas 
their division is counterproductive. 
Fifthly, one must take into account that, as of today, no project suggest-
ing Baltic energy integration has been implemented. At the same time, the 
situation around the LNG terminal construction follows the path of the dis-
cussion about the NPP construction. 
The meeting of the Presidents of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which 
took place on November 28, 2012, triggered a new surge of consultations in 
the Baltic States and new attempts to secure the EU’s financial support. Nei-
ther the former nor the latter is likely to prove successful. All of that resulted 
in a situation quite rare for Russian diplomacy, which gives room to hope for 
a successful implementation of Russian foreign economic plans in the Baltic 
region. One might say that Russian energy experts staked everything when 
they commenced the construction of the Baltic NPP without a safety net of 
export agreements and in an uncertain situation in foreign politics. However, 
the scale of problems associated with the development of a common energy 
policy in the Baltic States proved to be insurmountable. 
Let us make some conclusions. In 2012, the “nuclear projects” in the 
eastern part of the Baltic Sea region were divided into two principal groups: 
those of “political illusions” and “economic circumstances”. In this context, 
one should quote the symbolic thesis of the Prime Minister of the Republic 
of Lithuania, A. Butkevičius, who supported the idea of domestically gener-
ated electricity emphasising that analysts should “submit the calculations for 
the generation and transmission of electricity, as well as the final selling 
price in view of return on investment” [13]. Probably, it was the first time 
when a senior politician admitted the need for an economic rationale in en-
ergy projects. 
Expert evaluations are also changing. Of special interest is the position 
of the head of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Andris Spruds, 
who emphasised in January 2013: “Our cooperation with Russia has been 
rather constructive… however, in the field of energy, Russia poses certain 
risks for the Baltic States…” [14]. Nevertheless, today, even this pragmatic 
approach is not a dominant trend. 
In the current conditions, Russian diplomacy faces a task to coordinate 
the efforts of all stakeholders within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to 
formulate a new balanced agenda for the Baltic States. This agenda should 
take into account all aspects of relations between Russia and the Baltic 
States in the field of energy, including nuclear energy. 
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